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A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO CAPITAL ALLOCATION
V. MAUME-DESCHAMPS, D. RULLIÈRE, AND K. SAID
Abstract. The European insurance sector will soon be faced with the application of Solvency 2
regulation norms. It will create a real change in risk management practices. The ORSA approach
of the second pillar makes the capital allocation an important exercise for all insurers and specially
for groups. Considering multi-branches firms, capital allocation has to be based on a multivariate
risk modeling. Several allocation methods are present in the literature and insurers practices. In
this paper, we present a new risk allocation method, we study its coherence using an axiomatic
approach, and we try to define what the best allocation choice for an insurance group is.
Introduction
Solvency 2 standards will make a radical change in risk management practices in the actuarial
sector. They are based on a strengthening of risk control and minimization of a ruin probability.
The determination of the economic regulatory capital will be faced under this prudential mecha-
nism with a kind of methodological revolution. A choices of a dependence model between different
risks and of an aggregation methodology are both required. In the prescribed Standard Formula,
risks aggregation is done using correlation matrices that connect families and subfamilies of risks.
Once the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is calculated, its allocation between the different
risky activity branches becomes the new operational challenge.
Capital allocation is an internal exercise, certainly not controlled by the first pillar of Solvency 2,
but it plays a crucial role in determining performance of all the insurer activity. The case of insur-
ance groups requires special treatment in the context of the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment
(ORSA) approach. In this context, a multivariate analysis of risk seems relevant.
The issue of capital allocation in a multivariate context arises from the presence of dependence
between the various risky activities which may generate a diversification effect. Several allocation
methods in the literature are based on a choice of a univariate risk measure and an allocation
principle. Others are based on optimizing a multivariate ruin probability or some multivariate risk
indicators. In this paper, we focus on the allocation technique by minimizing some risk indicators.
The literature on the subject of capital allocation methods is very rich. Several principles have
been proposed over the last twenty years. The most important and most studied are the Shapley
method, the Aumann-Shapley method and the Euler’s method.
The Shapley method is based on cooperative game theory. It is described in detail in Denault’s
paper (2001) [10]. Denault proved that this method, originally used to allocate the total cost
between players in coalitional games context, can be easily adapted to solve the problem of the
overall risk allocation between segments.
Tasche devoted two papers [21] and [22] to describe Euler’s method. Euler’s method is also found
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in the literature under the name of gradient method. It is based on the idea of allocating capi-
tal according to the infinitesimal marginal impact of each risk. This impact corresponds to the
increase obtained on the overall risk, yielding an infinitely small increment in a marginal risk.
Euler’s method is very present in the literature. Several papers analyze its properties (RORAC
compatibility [6], [23], Coherence [5],...) under different assumptions (Tasche (2004) [20], Balog
(2011) [2]). Its fame is due to the existence of economic arguments that can justify its use to
develop allocation rules.
Finally, Aumann-Shapley method is a continuous generalization of Shapley method. Its principle
is based on the value introduced by Aumann and Shaplay in game theory. Denault [10] analyzes
this method and its application to capital allocation.
These three capital allocation principles rely on different risk measures. The coherence of the
allocation method depends on the properties of the selected risk measure. Several papers deal
with capital allocation coherence based on the properties of the risk measure used. We quote as
examples, Fischer (2003) [12], Bush and Dorfleitner (2008) [5], and Kalkbrener (2009) [16].
Other techniques have been proposed more recently for building optimal allocation methods,
by minimizing some multivariate ruin probabilities, especially those defined by Cai and Li (2007)
[7], or by minimizing some new multivariate risk indicators. In this context, Cénac et al. [8], [9]
defined three types of indicators, which take into account both the ruin severity at the branch level,
and the impact of the dependence structure on this local severity. In the one-period case, these
indicators can be considered as special cases of a general indicator family introduced in Dhaene et
al. (2012) [11]. Allocation by minimizing these indicators was studied in bivariate dimension by
Cénac et al. (2014) [8], and in higher dimension by Maume-Deshamps et al. (2015) [17]. In [17] we
study its behavior and its asymptotic behavior for some special distributions families. We study
also in the same paper, the impact of dependence on the allocation composition. In the present
paper we focus on the coherence properties of this kind of allocation methods.
Allocation by minimization of some real multivariate risk indicators can be used in a more gen-
eral framework for modeling systemic risk. In reinsurance, it can also be used to find optimal
stop-loss treaties in some special cases. This allocation technique can also help to measure the
performance of calculating the groups’ capital requirement in the Swiss Solvency Test (SST), which
provides a consistent framework both for legal branches and group solvency capital requirement.
The article is organized as follows. In the first section, we present the optimal allocation method
by minimizing multivariate risk indicators. Using an axiomatic approach, we define in section 2
some coherence properties for allocation methods in multivariate context. The third section is
devoted to the study of the coherence of the optimal allocation. Section 4 is a discussion about
the best allocation method choice for an insurance group.
1. Optimal allocation presentation
In a multivariate risk framework, we consider a vectorial risk process Xp = (Xp1 , . . . , X
p
d), where
Xpk corresponds to the losses of the k
th business line during the pth period. We denote by Rpk the
reserve of the kth line at time p, so: Rpk = uk−
p∑
l=1
X lk, where uk ∈ R
+ is the initial capital of the kth
business line. u = u1+· · ·+ud is the initial capital of the group and d is the number of business lines.
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Cénac et al. (2012) [9] defined the two following multivariate risk indicators, for d risks and
n periods, given penalty functions gk, k ∈ {1, . . . , d} :
• the indicator I:
I (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E

 n∑
p=1
gk(R
p
k)1 {Rpk<0}1 {
∑d
j=1
R
p
j
>0}

,
• the indicator J :
J (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E

 n∑
p=1
gk(R
p
k)1 {Rpk<0}1 {
∑d
j=1
R
p
j
<0}

,
gk : R
− → R+ are C1, convex functions with gk(0) = 0, gk(x) ≥ 0 for x < 0, k = 1, . . . , d.
They aggregate the cost that each branch has to pay when it becomes insolvent while the group
is solvent for the I indicator, or while the group is also insolvent in the case of the J indicator.
They proposed to allocate some capital u by minimizing these indicators. The idea is to find an
allocation vector (u1, . . . , ud) that minimizes the indicator such as u = u1 + · · · + ud, where u is
the initial capital that need to be shared among all branches.
The indicator I represents the expected sum of penalty amounts of local ruins, knowing that
the group remains solvent. In the case of the indicator J , the local ruin severities are taken into
account only in the case of group insolvency.
By using optimization stochastic algorithms, we may estimate the minimum of these risk in-
dicators. Cénac et al. (2012) [9] propose a Kiefer-Wolfowitz version of the mirror algorithm as
a convergent algorithm under general assumptions to find an optimal allocation minimizing the
indicator I. This algorithm is effective to solve the optimal allocation problem, especially, for a
large number of business lines, and for allocation over several periods.
1.1. Definitions and notations. Since new regulation rules, such as Solvency 2, require only a
justified allocation over a period of one year, we focus in this paper on the case of allocations on a
single period (n = 1). Another goal of this choice is to present a first computational approach. An
annual allocation seems to be a more efficient decision for an insurer; during a year of operation,
it will allow him to integrate the changes that occurred in his risk portfolio and its dependence
structure.
The following notations are used:
 u is the initial capital of the firm.
 Udu = {v = (v1, . . . , vd) ∈ [0, u]
d,
∑d
i=1 vi = u} is the set of possible allocations of the initial
capital u.
 For all i ∈ {1, . . . , d} let αi =
ui
u
, then,
∑d
i=1 αi = 1 if (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ U
d
u .
 1 du = {α = (α1, . . . , αd) ∈ [0, 1]
d,
∑d
i=1 αi = 1} is the set of possible allocation percentages
αi = ui/u.
 The risk Xk corresponds to the losses of the k
th branch during one period. It is a positive
random variable in our context.
 For (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ U
d
u , we define the reserve of the k
th business line at the end of the period
is: Rk = uk −Xk, where uk represents the part of capital allocated to the k
th branch.
 The aggregate sum of risks is: S =
∑d
i=1 Xi, and let S
−i =
∑d
j=1;j 6=iXj for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
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 FZ is the cumulative distribution function of a random variable Z, F¯Z is its survival function
and fZ its probability density function.
Definition 1.1 (Optimal allocation). Let X be a positive random vector of Rd, u ∈ R+ and
KX : U
d
u → R
+ a multivariate risk indicator associated to X and u. An optimal allocation of the
capital u for the risk vector X is defined by:
(u1, . . . , ud) ∈ arg inf
(v1,...,vd)∈Udu
{KX(v1, . . . , vd)} .
For risk indicators of the form KX(v) = E[S(X,v)], for a scoring function S : R
+d×R+
d
→ R+,
this definition can be seen as an extension in a multivariate framework of the elicitability concept.
Elicitability has been introduced by Gneiting (2011)[14], and studied recently for univariate risk
measures, by Bellini and Bignozzi (2013)[3], Ziegel (2014)[24] and Steinwart et al. (2014)[19], for
examples.
Assumptions. Throughout this paper, we will use the following assumptions:
H1: The risk indicator KX admits a unique minimum in U
d
u . In this case, we denote by
AX1,...,Xd(u) = (u1, . . . , ud) the optimal allocation of the amount u on the d risky branches
in Udu .
H2: The functions gk are differentiable and such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, g
′
k(uk − Xk)
admits a moment of order one, and (Xk, S) has a joint density distribution denoted by
f(Xk ,S).
H3: The d risks have the same penalty function gk = g, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
The first assumption is verified when the indicator is strictly convex, this is particularly true when
for at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, gk is strictly convex; and the joint density f(Xk,S) support contains
[0, u]2 (see [9]).
1.2. Optimality conditions. In this section, we focus on the optimality condition for the indi-
cators I and J .
For an initial capital u, and an optimal allocation minimizing the multivariate risk indicator I, we
seek u∗ ∈ Rd+ such that:
I (u∗) = inf
v1+···+vd=u
I (v), v ∈ Rd+.
Under assumption H2, the risk indicators I and J are differentiable, and in this case, we may
calculate the following gradients:
(∇I(v))i =
d∑
k=1
∫ +∞
vk
gk(vk − x)fXk ,S(x, u)dx+ E[g
′
i(vi −Xi)1 {Xi>vi}1 {S≤u}]
and, (∇J(v))i =
d∑
k=1
∫ +∞
vk
gk(vk − x)fXk ,S(x, u)dx+ E[g
′
i(vi −Xi)1 {Xi>vi}1 {S≥u}].
Under H1 and H2, using the Lagrange multipliers method, we obtain an optimality condition
verified by the unique solution to this optimization problem:
(1.1) E[g′i(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′
i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}
2.
A natural choice for penalty functions is the ruin severity: gk(x) = |x|. In that case, and if the joint
density f(Xk ,S) support contains [0, u]
2, for at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, our optimization problem
has a unique solution.
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We may write the indicators as follows:
I (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
|Rk|1 {Rk<0}1 {
∑d
i=1
Ri≥0}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {
∑d
i=1
Xi≤u}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)
+1 {S≤u}
)
,
and,
J (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
|Rk|1 {Rk<0}1 {
∑d
i=1
Ri≤0}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {
∑d
i=1
Xi≥u}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)
+1 {S≥u}
)
.
The respective components of the gradient of these indicators are of the form:
KI − P

X1 > u1, d∑
j=1
Xj ≤ u

 , . . . , KI − P

Xd > ud, d∑
j=1
Xj ≤ u

 ,
and,
KJ − P

X1 > u1, d∑
j=1
Xj ≥ u

 , . . . , KJ − P

Xd > ud, d∑
j=1
Xj ≥ u

 ,
where,
KI = KJ =
d∑
k=1
∫ +∞
uk
(x− uk)fXk,S(x, u)dx.
Using the Lagrange multipliers to solve our convex optimization problem under the only constraint
u1+u2+ · · ·+ud = u, the following optimality conditions are obtained from 1.1 in the special case
where gk(x) = |x|:
(1.2) P (Xi > ui, S ≤ u) = P (Xj > uj, S ≤ u) , ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
2.
For the J indicator, this condition can be written:
(1.3) P (Xi > ui, S ≥ u) = P (Xj > uj, S ≥ u) , ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
2.
Some explicit and semi-explicit formulas for the optimal allocation can be obtained with this op-
timality condition. Our problem reduces to the study of this allocation depending on the nature
of the distributions of the risk Xk and on the form of dependence between them.
2. Coherence of a capital allocation in a multivariate context
In his article [10], Denault introduced the notion of a coherent allocation, fixing four axioms that
must be verified by a principle of capital allocation in order to be qualified as coherent. Denault’s
definition can be used only for allocation methods driven by univariate risk measures, especially
coherent ones, according to the criteria defined by Artzner et al. (1999) [1]. Our optimal capital
allocation is not directly derived from a univariate risk measure, even if it is obtained by minimiz-
ing a multivariate risk indicator.
In this section, we reformulate coherence axioms in a more general multivariate context. We
define also other coherence properties and we try to justify for each one why it is a desirable
property from an economic point of view.
5
2.1. Coherence. We follow Denault’s idea to define a coherent capital allocation in a multivariate
context.
Definition 2.1 (Coherence). A capital allocation (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) of an initial capital
u ∈ R+ is coherent if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Full allocation: All of the capital u ∈ R+ must be allocated between the branches:
d∑
i=1
ui = u.
2. Symmetry: If the joint distribution of the vector (X1, . . . , Xd) is unchanged by permuta-
tion of the risksXi andXj, then the allocation remains also unchanged by this permutation,
and the ith and jth business lines both make the same contribution to the risk capital: if
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xj−1, Xj, Xj+1, . . . , Xd)
L
=
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xj , Xi+1, . . . , Xj−1, Xi, Xj+1, . . . , Xd),
then ui = uj.
3. Riskless allocation: For a deterministic risk X = c, where the constant c ∈ R+:
AX,X1,...,Xd(u) = (c, AX1,...,Xd(u− c)).
This property means that the allocation method relates only risky branches, the presence
of a deterministic risk has no impact on the share allocated to the risky branches.
4. Sub-additivity: ∀M ⊆ {1, . . . , d}, let (u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
r) = A
∑
i∈M
Xi,Xj∈{1,...,d}\M
(u), where
r = d− card(M) and (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u):
u∗ ≤
∑
i∈M
ui.
This property means that the allocation takes into account the diversification gain. It is
related to the no undercut property defined by Denault, which has no sense in our context.
5. Comonotonic additivity: For r 6 d comonotonic risks,
AXii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CR
Xk
(u) = (uii∈{1,...,d}\CR,
∑
k∈CR
uk),
where (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) is the allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xd) and CR
denotes the set of the r comonotonic risk indexes.
The concept of comonotonic random variables is related to the studies of Hoeffding (1940)
[15] and Fréchet (1951) [13]. Here we use the definition of comonotonic risks as it was first
mentioned in the actuarial literature in Borch (1962) [4].
A vector of random variables (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is comonotonic if and only if there exists a
random variable Y and non-decreasing functions ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that:
(X1, . . . , Xn) =d (ϕ1(Y ), . . . , ϕn(Y )).
2.2. Other desirable properties. We define also some desirable properties that an allocation
should naturally satisfy. These properties are based on the ideas presented by Artzner et al. (1999)
[1] for coherent risk measures and on the axiomatic characterization of coherent capital allocations
given by Kalkbrener (2009) [16].
Definition 2.2 (Positive homogeneity). An allocation is positively homogeneous, if for any α ∈
R
+, it satisfies:
AαX1,...,αXd(αu) = αAX1,...,Xd(u).
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In other words, a capital allocation method is positively homogeneous, if it is insensitive to cash
changes.
Definition 2.3 (Translation invariance). An allocation is invariant by translation, if for all
(a1, . . . , ad) ∈ R
d, it satisfies:
AX1−a1,...,Xd−ad(u) = AX1,...,Xd
(
u+
d∑
k=1
ak
)
− (a1, . . . , ad).
The translation invariance property shows that the impact of an increase (decrease) of a risk by
a constant amount of its share of allocation of the capital u, boils down to an increase (decrease)
of its share in the allocation of such capital decreased (increased) by the same amount.
Definition 2.4 (Continuity). An allocation is continuous, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
lim
→0
AX1,...,(1+)Xi,...,Xd(u) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u).
This property reflects the fact that a small change to the risk of a business line, have only limited
effect on the capital part that we attribute to it.
Let us recall the definition of the order stochastic dominance, as it is presented in Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007)[18]. For random variables X and Y , Y first-order stochastically dominates
X if and only if:
F¯X(x) ≤ F¯Y (x), ∀x ∈ R
+,
and in this case we denote: X ≤st Y .
This definition is also equivalent to the following one:
X ≤st Y ⇔ E[u(X)] ≤ E[u(Y )], for all u increasing function
Definition 2.5 (Monotonicity). An allocation satisfies the monotonicity property, if for (i, j) ∈
{1, . . . , d}2:
Xi ≤st Xj ⇒ ui ≤ uj.
The monotonicity is a natural requirement, it reflects the fact that if a branch Xj is riskier than
branch Xi. Then, it is natural to allocate more capital to the risk Xj .
The RORAC compatibility property defined by Dirk Tasche [21] loses its meaning in absence of
the risk measure used in the construction of the allocation method.
3. Coherence of the optimal allocation
In what follows, we show that the capital allocation minimizing the indicator I, satisfies the
coherence axioms of Definition 2.1, except the sub-additivity. We show also that it satisfies other
desirable properties in the second subsection. The same holds for the indicator J .
3.1. Coherence. Firstly, the full allocation axiom is verified by construction, since any optimal
allocation satisfies the equality:
d∑
i=1
ui = u.
Proposition 3.1 shows that the optimal allocation satisfies the symmetry property.
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Proposition 3.1 (Symmetry). Under H1, if for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2, i 6= j, the couples
(Xi, S
−i) and (Xj, S
−j) are identically distributed and the penalty functions gi and gj are the
same gi = gj, then:
ui = uj.
Proof. Let (i 6= j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2 be such that (Xi, S
−i) and (Xj, S
−j) have the same distribution
and the same penalty function gi = gj = g. If ui 6= uj, we may assume i < j, and denote:
(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xj ,...,Xd(u),
then,
I(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud) = inf
v∈Udu
I (v) = inf
v∈Udu
d∑
k=1
E
(
gk(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u}
)
.
On the other hand, and since gi = gj = g and (Xi, S
−i) ∼ (Xj, S
−j), then:
I(u1, . . . , ui−1, uj, ui+1, . . . , uj−1, ui, uj+1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1,k 6=i,k 6=j
E
(
gk(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u}
)
+ E
(
g(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}
)
+ E
(
g(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}
)
= I(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud).
From H1, the indicator I admits a unique minimum in Udu , we deduce that:
(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud) = (u1, . . . , ui−1, uj, ui+1, . . . , uj−1, ui, uj+1, . . . , ud).
We conclude that ui = uj . 
Corollary 3.2. Under Assumptions H1 and H3, if (X1, . . . , Xd) is an exchangeable random vector,
then the allocation by minimizing I and J indicators is the same and is given by:
AX1,...,Xd(u) =
(
u
d
,
u
d
, . . . ,
u
d
)
.
The following proposition shows that the optimal allocation verifies the Riskless allocation axiom.
Proposition 3.3 (Riskless Allocation). Under Assumptions H1 and H3, and for 1-homogeneous
penalty functions, for any c ∈ R:
Ac,X1,...,Xd(u) = (c, AX1,...,Xd(u− c)),
where (c, AX1,...,Xd(u− c)) is the concatenated vector of c and the vector AX1,...,Xd(u− c).
Proof. The presence of a discrete distribution makes the indicator I not differentiable, so we cannot
use neither the gradient, nor the optimality condition obtained in the case of existence of joined
densities.
Let (u∗, u∗1, · · · , u
∗
d) = Ac,X1,...,Xd(u) and (u1, · · · , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u− c).
We denote S =
∑d
i=1 Xi, and the common penalty function g = gk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the function g
is convex on R− and g(0) = 0, we deduce that g is also positively homogeneous.
We distinguish between three possibilities:
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• Case 1: u∗ < c
In this case,
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) = inf
v∈Ud+1u
I (v) = inf
v∈Ud+1u
d∑
k=0
E
(
g(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
= E
(
g(u∗ − c)1 {S≤u−c}
)
+
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d} we put, for example, αk = α =
u∗−c
d
< 0, and since the function g is
convex and g(0) = 0, it satisfies for all real 0 < β < 1, g(βx) ≤ βg(x), ∀x ∈ R−. Then:
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) ≥ E
(
d · g
(
u∗ − c
d
)
1 {S≤u−c}
)
+
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
= E
(
d · g (−(−α)+) 1 {S≤u−c}
)
+
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − u
∗
k)+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
[g(−(Xk − u
∗
k)+) + g(−(−αk)+)]1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
x→ g(−(x)+) is also a 1-homogeneous convex function, then:
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) ≥
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − (u
∗
k + αk))+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
we remark that
∑d
k=1(u
∗
k + αk) = u− c, then (u
∗
1 + α, . . . , u
∗
d + α) ∈ U
d
u−c.
So,
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) ≥
d∑
k=1
E
(
g((u∗k + αk)−Xk))1 {Xk>u∗k+αk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
≥ inf
v∈Udu−c
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(uk −Xk)
+1 {S≤u−c}
)
= I(c, u1, . . . , ud),
then,
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) ≥ I(c, u1, . . . , ud).
That is contradictory with the uniqueness of the minimum on the set Ud+1u .
• Case 2: u∗ > c
We have :
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
and,
I(c, u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
.
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Let α = u
∗−c
d
> 0, we remark that,(u∗1+α, . . . , u
∗
d+α) ∈ U
d
u−c, and that the penalty function
g is decreasing on R− because g′′(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R− and g′(0+) = 0. Then,
I(c, u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − uk)+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
= inf
v∈Udu−c
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
≤
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − (u
∗
k + α))+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
<
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − u
∗
k))+1 {S≤u−c}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
= I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d).
That is contradictory with the fact that I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) = inf
v∈Ud+1u
I (v).
We deduce that the only possible case is the third one u∗ = c.
• Case 3: u∗ = c
The uniqueness of the minimum implies that:
(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) = (c, u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
d) = argmin
Ud+1u
d∑
k=1
E[g(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u−c}]
= argmin
Udu−c
d∑
k=1
E[g(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u−c}]
= (c, u1, . . . , ud).
Finally, we have proven that:
(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) = (c, u1, . . . , ud).

Lemma 3.4 is related to the sub-additivity property. It will be used in the proof of the comono-
tonic additivity property.
Lemma 3.4. Under Assumptions H1,H2 and H3, and for all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2, and where, x.ei
is the dot product of the vector x ∈ Rd and the ith component of the canonical basis of Rd.
• if AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ei < AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej), then:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ i, j, AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ek > AX1,...,Xd(u).ek,
• if AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ei > AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej), then:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ i, j, AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ek < AX1,...,Xd(u).ek,
• if AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ei = AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej), then:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ i, j, AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ek = AX1,...,Xd(u).ek.
Proof. In order to simplify the notation, and without loss of generality, we assume i = d − 1 and
j = d. We put,(u1, . . . , ud−1, ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) and (u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
d−2, u
∗
d−1) = AX1,...,Xd−2,Xd−1+Xd(u).
The optimality condition for (u1, . . . , ud−1, ud) is given ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}
2 by equation 1.1:
E[g′i(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′
i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}] = λ,
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and for (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d−2, u
∗
d−1) is ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 2}
E[g′i(u
∗
i −Xi)1 {Xi>u∗i }1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′
i(u
∗
d−1 − (Xd−1 +Xd))1 {Xd+Xd−1>u∗d−1}1 {S≤u}] = λ
∗.
Now, we suppose that u∗d−1 > ud + ud−1. In this case there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , d − 2} such that
u∗k < uk, and since the function x→ g
′(−(x)+) is decreasing on R
+, then:
E[g′i(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u}] = λ < E[g
′
i(u
∗
k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u}] = λ
∗
we deduce from this that for all k ∈ 1, . . . , d− 2 : u∗k < uk.
The proof is the same if we suppose that u∗d−1 < ud + ud−1, and the additive case is a corollary of
the two previous ones. 
Proposition 3.5 (Comonotonic additivity). Under Assumption H2, and for gk(x) = |x|, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, if r ≤ d risks Xii∈CR are comonotonic, then:
AXii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CR
Xk
(u) = (uii∈{1,...,d}\CR,
∑
k∈CR
uk),
where (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) is the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xd),
AXii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CR
Xk
(u) is the optimal allocation of u on the n−d+1 risks (Xii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CRXk),
and CR denote the set of the r comonotonic risk indexes.
Proof. For (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2, if Xi and Xj are comonotonic risks, then, there exists an increasing
non negative function h such that Xi = h(Xj), and we remark that h is strictly increasing under
Assumption H2. Let f be the function x→ f(x) = x+ h(x), so that Xi +Xj = f(Xj).
We denote (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) and (u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
d−1) = AXi∈{1,...,d}\{i,j},Xi+Xj (u), then,
AXi∈{1,...,d}\{i,j},Xi+Xj (u).ed−1 = u
∗
d−1 and AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej) = ui + uj.
From the optimality condition for the allocation AX1,...,Xd(u), given in Equation 1.2:
P(Xi ≥ ui, S ≤ u) = P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≤ u),
we deduce that ui = h(uj) and that ui + uj = f(uj).
If there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j}, such that u∗k < uk, then ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j}:
P(Xk ≥ u
∗
k, S ≤ u) > P(Xk ≥ uk, S ≤ u),
so,
P(Xi +Xj ≥ u
∗
d−1, S ≤ u) = P(Xj ≥ f
−1(u∗d−1), S ≤ u)
= P(Xk ≥ u
∗
k, S ≤ u)
> P(Xk ≥ uk, S ≤ u)
= P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≤ u),
finally, we deduce that: f−1(u∗d−1) < uj, then u
∗
d−1 < f(uj) = ui + uj and,∑
k∈{1,...,d}\{i,j} u
∗
k <
∑
k∈{1,...,d}\{i,j} uk which is absurd.
In the same way, the case uk < u
∗
k for k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j} leads to the contradiction.
Using Lemma 3.4, and under Assumption H3, we deduce the optimal allocation for the other risks
Xk, k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j}.
The additivity property for two comonotonic risks can be trivially generalized to several comono-
tonic risks. 
Concerning the sub-additivity property, we have not yet managed to build a demonstration for
this property. However, simulations using the optimization algorithm presented in Cénac et al.
(2012) [9], seem to confirm the sub-additivity of the allocation by minimizing the indicators I and
J , even for classic examples of non sub-additivity of the risk measure VaR.
11
Remark 3.6. The previous properties have been demonstrated for the optimal allocation by min-
imizing the risk indicator I, they can be demonstrated with the same arguments for the optimal
allocation by minimization of the indicator J .
3.2. Other desirable properties. In this section, we show that the optimal allocation by mini-
mization of the indicators I and J satisfies some desirable properties. We consider the allocation
by minimizing the multivariate risk indicator I, the proofs are almost the same in the case of the
indicator J .
Proposition 3.7 (Positive homogeneity). Under Assumption H1, and for 1-homogeneous penalty
functions gk, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, for any α ∈ R
+:
AαX1,...,αXd(αu) = αAX1,...,Xd(u).
Proof. Since the penalty functions are convex and 1-homogeneous, then, for any α ∈ R∗+ :
AαX1,...,αXd(αu) = argmin
(u∗
1
,...,u∗
d
)∈Udαu
d∑
k=1
E[gk(u
∗
k − αXk)1 {αXk>u∗k}1 {αS≤αu}]
= argmin
(u∗
1
,...,u∗
d
)∈Udαu
d∑
k=1
αE[gk
(
u∗k
α
−Xk
)
1
{Xk>
u∗
k
α
}
1 {S≤u}]
= argmin
(u∗
1
,...,u∗
d
)∈Udαu
d∑
k=1
E[gk
(
u∗k
α
−Xk
)
1
{Xk>
u∗
k
α
}
1 {S≤u}]
= α argmin
(u1,...,ud)∈Udu
d∑
k=1
E[gk(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u}]
= αAX1,...,Xd(u).

Proposition 3.8 (Translation invariance). Under Assumptions H1, H2 and for all (a1, . . . , ad) ∈
R
d, such that the joint density f(Xk, S) support contains [0, u+
∑d
k=1 ak]
2, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
AX1−a1,...,Xd−ad(u) = AX1,...,Xd
(
u+
d∑
k=1
ak
)
− (a1, . . . , ad).
Proof. We denote by (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) the optimal allocation AX1−a1,...,Xd−ad(u), and by (u1, . . . , ud) the
optimal allocation AX1,...,Xd
(
u+
∑d
k=1 ak
)
.
Using the optimality condition (1.1), (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
d) is the unique solution in U
d
u of the following
equations system:
E[g′i(u
∗
i−(Xi−ai))1 {Xi−ai>u∗i }1 {S−a≤u}] = E[g
′
j(u
∗
j−(Xj−aj))1 {Xj−aj>u∗j}1 {S−a≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
where a =
∑d
k=1 ak. Then, (u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
d) satisfies also:
E[g′i(u
∗
i +ai−Xi)1 {Xi>u∗i+ai}1 {S≤u+a}] = E[g
′
i(u
∗
i +aj−Xj)1 {Xj>u∗j+ai}1 {S≤u+a}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Since, (u∗1 + a1, . . . , u
∗
d + ad) ∈ U
d
u+a, and from the solution uniqueness of the optimality condi-
tion (1.1) for the allocationAX1,...,Xd (u+ a), we deduce that: u
∗
k+ak = uk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}. 
Proposition 3.9 (Continuity). Under Assumptions H1 and H2, and if ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ∃0 > 0
such that:
∀, || < 0, E[ sup
v∈[0,u]
|g′k(v − (1 + )Xk)|] < +∞,
12
then, if (X1, . . . , Xd) is a continuous random vector, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
lim
→0
AX1,...,(1+)Xi,...,Xd(u) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u).
Proof. Let (u1, . . . , ud) be the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xd):
(u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u),
then (u1, . . . , ud) is the unique solution in U
d
u of Equations system (1.1):
E[g′i(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′
i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
For  ∈ R, let (u1, . . . , u

d) be the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xi−1, (1 +
)Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xd):
(u1, . . . , u

d) = AX1,...,Xi−1,(1+)Xi,Xi+1,...,Xd(u),
then (u1, . . . , u

d) is the unique solution in U
d
u of the following equations system:
E[g′i(u

i − (1 + )Xi)1 {(1+)Xi>ui}1 {S+Xi≤u}] = E[g
′
i(u

j −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S+Xi≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Since Udu is a compact on (R
+)d, we may consider a convergent subsequence (uk1 , . . . , u
k
d ) of
(u1, . . . , u

d).
Since the penalties functions satisfy:
∃0 > 0, ∀, || < 0, E[ sup
v∈[0,u]
|g′k(v − (1 + )Xk)|] < +∞,
we use Lebesgue’s dominated convergence Theorem to get:
E[g′i(lim
→0
uki −Xi)1 {Xi> lim
→0
u
k
i
}1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′
i(lim
→0
ukj −Xj)1 {Xj> lim
→0
u
k
j
}1 {S≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
thereby (lim
→0
uk1 , . . . , lim
→0
ukd ) is a solution of Equation (1.1), because
∑d
l=1 lim
→0
ukl = lim
→0
∑d
l=1 u

l = u,
(lim
→0
uk1 , . . . , lim
→0
ukd ) ∈ U
d
u .
From the solution uniqueness of (1.1) in Udu , we deduce that: lim
k→∞
uki = ui for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
For all convergent subsequence of (u1, . . . , u

d) the limit point is (u1, . . . , ud), we deduce that:
lim
→0
(u1, . . . , u

d) = (u1, . . . , ud).

Proposition 3.10 (Monotonicity). Under Assumption H2, and for (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2, such that
gi = gj = g:
Xi ≤st Xj ⇒ ui ≤ uj.
Proof. Let (u1, . . . , uj) be the optimal allocation AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u), under Assumption H2, the op-
timality condition (1.1) is written as follows:
E[g′(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}].
Now if Xi ≤st Xj , and since, x 7→ −g
′(−(ui − x)+)1 {S≤u} is an increasing function on R
+, then:
E[g′(ui −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}] ≤ E[g
′(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}].
We deduce that:
E[g′(ui −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}] ≤ E[g
′(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}],
and since, g′ is an increasing function, and the distributions are all continuous, that implies:
uj ≥ ui. 
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By combining all the properties demonstrated in this section, we show that in the case of penalty
functions gk(x) = |x| ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and for continuous random vector (X1, . . . , Xd), such that the
joint density f(Xk,S) support contains [0, u]
2, for at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the optimal allocation
by minimization of the indicators I and J is a symmetric riskless full allocation. It satisfies the
properties of comonotonic additivity, positive homogeneity, translation invariance, monotonicity,
and continuity.
These properties are therefore desirable from an economic point of view, the fact that they are
satisfied by the proposed optimal allocation implies that this allocation method may well be used
for the economic capital allocation between the different branches of a group, in terms of their
actual participation in the overall risk, taking into account both their marginal distributions and
their dependency structures with the remaining branches.
4. Discussion: What could be the best choice for a capital allocation?
In section 3, we tried to explain why the optimal allocation can be considered coherent from an
economic point of view. Now, the most practical question is to define the best allocation method
choice for an insurer.
The first goal of Solvency 2 norms is the insurers’ protection and the ORSA approach is based
on the minimization of risk at both the local and global levels. The classical methods of risk
allocation give the weight of each business line in the group risk. The optimal allocation is based
on the global risk optimization. From this point of view, the optimal capital allocation seems more
in coherence with the ORSA goal. Indeed, the optimal allocation gives a second risk management
level, after the solvency capital requirement determination.
The best allocation method choice depends finally on the risk aversion of the insurer. If the
SCR is considered as the only risk management level, the classical methods of risk allocation are
sufficient. If the insurer accepts to enhance his security level as it is the ORSA aim, the optimal
allocation can be a good practical answer to this need.
Conventional capital allocation methods are based on a chosen univariate risk measure, their
properties derive from those of this risk measure. It seems more coherent in a multivariate frame-
work to use directly a multivariate risk indicator, not only for risk measurement, but also for
capital allocation.
Another important criterion for allocation method choice is the capital nature. The allocation
of an investment capital may be different from that of a solvency capital.
Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that the capital allocation method by minimization of multivariate
risk indicators can be considered as coherent from an economic point of view. This method also
illustrates the importance of the risky business portfolio choice and its impact on the management
of the overall company capital.
This method can be developed if one can construct some broader sets of multivariate risk indi-
cators as this is the case for univariate risk measures.
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Finally, the choice of a capital allocation method remains a complex and crucial exercise because
some methods may be better suited to deal with specific issues, others can lead to dangerously
wrong financial decisions. In the case of the proposed optimal capital allocation, the risk manage-
ment is at the heart of the allocation process, and the company can allocate its capital and reduces
its overall risk at the same time. Its risk aversion is reflected by the choice of the multivariate
risk indicator to minimize. That is why we think that from a risk management point of view, this
method can be considered as more flexible.
References
[1] P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J-M. Eber, and D. Heath. Coherent measures of risk. Mathematical Finance, 9(3):203–
228, 1999.
[2] D. Balog. Capital allocation in financial institutions: the euler method. Iehas discussion papers, Institute of
Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, June 2011.
[3] F. Bellini and V. Bignozzi. Elicitable risk measures. Available at SSRN 2334746, December 2013.
[4] K. Borch. Equilibrium in a reinsurance market. Econometrica, (30):424–444, 1962.
[5] A. Buch and G. Dorfleitner. Coherent risk measures, coherent capital allocations and the gradient allocation
principle. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 42(1):235 – 242, 2008.
[6] A. Buch, G. Dorfleitner, and M. Wimmer. Risk capital allocation for rorac optimization. Journal of Banking
& Finance, 35(11):3001–3009, August 2011.
[7] J. Cai and H. Li. Dependence properties and bounds for ruin probabilities in multivariate compound risk
models. Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 98(4):757 – 773, 2007.
[8] P. Cénac, S. Loisel, V. Maume-Deschamps, and C. Prieur. Risk indicators with several lines of business:
comparison, asymptotic behavior and applications to optimal reserve allocation. Annales de l’ISUP, 58(3),
2014.
[9] P. Cénac, V. Maume-Deschamps, and C. Prieur. Some Multivariate risk indicators: Minimization by using a
Kiefer-Wolfowitz approach to the mirror stochastic algorithm . Statistics and Risk Modeling, 29(1):47–71, 2012.
[10] M. Denault. Coherent allocation of risk capital. Journal of risk, 4:1–34, January 2001.
[11] J. Dhaene, E.A. Valdez, A. Tsanakas, and S. Vanduffel. Optimal capital allocation principles. The Journal of
Risk and Insurance, 79(1):1–28, 2012.
[12] T. Fischer. Risk capital allocation by coherent risk measures based on one-sided moments. Insurance: Mathe-
matics and Economics, 32(1):135 – 146, 2003.
[13] M. Fréchet. Sur les tableaux de corrélation dont les marges sont données. Annales de l’université de Lyon,
Section.A, Series 3., (14):53–77, 1951.
[14] T. Gneiting. Making and Evaluating Point Forecasts . Journal of the American Statistical Association,
106(494):746–762, June 2011.
[15] W. Hoeffding. Masstabinvariante Korrelationstheorie. Schriften des mathematischen Instituts und des Instituts
für angewandte Mathematik der Universität Berlin, (5):179–233, 1940.
[16] M. Kalkbreneri. An axiomatic characterization of capital allocations of coherent risk measures. Quantitative
Finance, 9(8):961–965, 2009.
[17] V. Maume-Deschamps, D. Rullière, and K. SAID. Impact of dependence on some multivariate risk indicators.
preprint HAL.
[18] M. Shaked and J.G. Shanthikumar. Stochastic Orders. Springer Series in Statistics, 2007.
[19] I. Steinwart, C. Pasin, R. C.Williamson, and S. Zhang. Elicitation and Identification of Properties. Workshop
and Conference Proceedings, 34:1–45, 2014.
[20] D. Tasche. Allocating portfolio economic capital to sub-portfolios. In Economic Capital: A Practitioner Guide,
Risk Books, pages 275–302. Risk Books, 2004.
[21] D. Tasche. Euler allocation: Theory and practice. Technical Report arXiv:0708.2542, Aug 2007.
[22] D. Tasche. Capital allocation to business units and sub-portfolios: the euler principle. Papers 0708.2542,
arXiv.org, 2008.
[23] G. Zanjani. An economic approach to capital allocation. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(3):523–549, 2010.
[24] J.F. Ziegel. Coherence and elicitability. arXiv preprint arXiv:1303.1690.
15
Université de Lyon, Université Lyon 1,France, Institut Camille Jordan UMR 5208
E-mail address: veronique.maume@univ-lyon1.fr
Université de Lyon, Université Lyon 1,France, Laboratoire SAF EA 2429
E-mail address: didier.rulliere@univ-lyon1.fr
Université de Lyon, Université Lyon 2,France, Laboratoires SAF EA 2429 & COACTIS EA 4161
E-mail address: khalil.said@univ-lyon2.fr
16
